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THE 1987 TAKINGS TRILOGY

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 1987
TAKINGS TRILOGY: THE KEYSTONE,
NOLLAN AND FIRST ENGLISH CASES
INTRODUCTION

The fifth amendment's just compensation clause1 prohibits federal and state governments2 from taking private property for public
use3 without paying just compensation. Interpretation of the clause
generally arises in two settings. The typical context involves governmental exercise of the power of eminent domain to acquire private
property.8 The most familiar example is the condemnation of houses
along the right-of-way of a proposed highway.
The other setting involves governmental exercise of power, other
than the intentional exercise of the power of eminent domain, that
affects private property so as to require invalidation of the governmental action, compensation or some other remedy. This other setting is usually described as the "takings problem."' It may arise
1. The just compensation clause provides:
[Nior shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. The Supreme Court first held the fifth amendment's just compensation clause applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause in Chicago, B. & Q.
R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). See e.g. First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2383 n.4 (1987) ("The Fifth Amendment
. . . applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.").
3. The "public use" limitation requires only that the governmental action involved must
be reasonably related to the achievement of a legitimate governmental objective. Hawaii Hous.
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). For a critique of the relatively flimsy nature of that
limitation, see Ross, TransferringLand to Private Entities by the Power of Eminent Domain,
51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 355 (1983).
4. Fair market value is the usual measure of "just" compensation. For a thoughtful
analysis, see Francis, Eminent Domain Compensation in Western States: A Critique of the
Fair Market Value Model, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 429 (1984).
5. The power of eminent domain, sometimes known as the power of "direct condemnation," is an inherent governmental power sometimes referred to as an attribute of sovereignty.
See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal.
3d 60, 62, 646 P.2d 835, 837, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (1982).
6. Classical analyses of the takings problem include B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967); Sax,
Takings, PrivateProperty and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power:
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from the exercise of almost any governmental power.' This problem
has arisen most frequently, however, when governments have exercised the power to control land use.'

After generally avoiding decisions on the merits in takings cases
for nearly a decade, the Supreme Court in 1987 decided three cases
involving "takings" challenges to states' exercise of the power to control land use." In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,10
the Court held that Pennsylvania could prohibit coal mining under
certain structures unless coal "pillars" were left to support the overlying structures," even though that effectively prevented coal owners
from mining about 2% of their coal, which amounted to about 27
million tons. 2 In Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 3 the Court
held that the Commission's requirement that the Nollans convey an
easement to the state allowing public access along the seaward side

of their coastal property as a condition on the Commission's grant of
a permit to allow them to demolish an existing dilapidated bungalow
and construct a new three-bedroom house was a "taking." The Court
further held that since the condition did not substantially advance a
legitimate state interest, the just compensation clause required compensation. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County

of Los Angeles,"' the Court held that if a county's zoning ordinance
prohibited all use of land and was therefore held to be a taking of
property through regulatory action, then the property owner could
recover damages from the county for the period of time during
The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1971).
7. For example, in Summa Corp. v. California, 466 U.S. 198 (1984), the state asserted a
"public trust" easement over private lands under state constitutional authority. In Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981), the plaintiff complained that the President's freezing of Iranian assets under the power over foreign affairs improperly affected its property. In
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), the United States was trying to force the
plaintiff to allow public access to a private marina under the federal commerce power to regulate navigable waters.
8. Governmental power to control land use derives from the police power to regulate for
the general health, safety, welfare and morals. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926).
9. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (summarizing cases).
10. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
11. Coal "pillars" are similar to the columns supporting the next higher floor in a parking structure. The surface of the next higher floor is analogous to the overlying surface under
which mining occurs.
12. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1248.
13. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
14. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
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which the ordinance had been in force against the property.
The takings problem can be productively examined according to
a three-part analytical framework: First, is private property involved? Second, has governmental action so affected it as to require
a remedy? Finally, what should be the appropriate remedy?1" The
three takings cases decided in 1987 fit nicely within that framework:
The Keystone case is principally concerned with the threshold question of defining private property for purposes of the just compensation clause; the Nollan case deals primarily with the circumstances
under which a "taking" will be found and the First English case
concerns the question of the appropriate remedy.
This article critically examines these decisions in terms of this
analytical framework and concludes that they represent the proverbial one step forward and two steps backward along the path toward
a coherent takings jurisprudence.1 6 First English is the lone step forward: it held that compensation, not just invalidation, is the constitutionally compelled remedy for takings, thus resolving a hotly contested debate of long standing. 7 Keystone, however, adds new
uncertainties about how the Court will identify the relevant property
for takings purposes. Nollan takes another step backward by introducing a per se taking justification rule which appears to be an intermediate construct between the takings and remedy determinations.

15. For a discussion of the underpinnings of this analytical framework, see Martinez,
Reconstructing Takings Doctrine by Redefining Property and Sovereignty, 16 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. (1987). For other references to the takings problem as a three-part inquiry, see B.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION

6 (1977) and Note, Takings Law

and the Contract Clause: A Takings Law Approach to Legislative Modifications of Public
Contracts, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1479-81 (1984) (authored by Michael Zigler).
16. This article is thus primarily descriptive. My prescriptive analysis with respect to the
takings problem is set out in Martinez, Reconstructing Takings Doctrine by Redefining Property and Sovereignty, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (1987) (unpublished), in which I suggest
that the disarray in takings jurisprudence results from the Supreme Court's ambivalent approach to defining property for federal constitutional purposes and recommend that the Court
should forthrightly adopt a principled approach toward defining constitutional property. I describe a functional approach that may prove useful.
17. See. e.g., Bauman, The Supreme Court. Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth
Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RUTGERS
L.J. 15 (1983); Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker, Babcock, The White River Junction
Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193 (1984); Sterk, Government Liability for Unconstitutional Land
Use Regulation, 60 IND. L.J. 113 (1984); Note, Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: The
Availability of a Damages Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulation, 29 UCLA L. REV.
711 (1982) (authored by Robert McMurry).
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DISTINGUISHING PRIVATE FROM PUBLIC LEGISLATIVE PURPOSES

AND IDENTIFYING THE RELEVANT PROPERTY-THE QUESTIONABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE KEYSTONE CASE

In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,18 decided in 1922, the
Court held that Pennsylvania could not prohibit coal owners from
mining without leaving pillars of coal to prevent subsidence of overlying structures. The Keystone case involved facts so similar to Pennsylvania Coal that it was viewed as Pennsylvania Coal, reincarnated. 9 This time, however, the coal companies lost. The Court

found the two cases distinguishable on two major grounds. We might
refer to the first as the "public purposes" ground and to the second
as the "relevant property" ground.
A.

Distinguishing Pennsylvania Coal on Public Purposes
Grounds

It is helpful to locate the "public purpose" inquiry in relation to

the three-part analytical framework for takings questions.2 0 Both the
just compensation and due process" clauses prohibit governmental

action not undertaken for a public purpose. 2' Thus, if "property" has
been "taken"-even if an appropriate "remedy" is provided-the
governmental action is nevertheless improper unless it is for a public
purpose.2 3
In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court held that the Kohler Act, 4
18. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
19. See Comment, Pennsylvania Surface Mining Legislation: A Regulatory Mire, 47 U.
PiTT. L. REV. 517 (1986) (authored by Penina Kessler Lieber).
20. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
21. The fourteenth amendment's due process clause provides in pertinent part: [N]or
shall any State deprive any person of ... property, without due process of law ....
U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. There is a similar due process provision in the fifth amendment: No
person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. . . . U. S.
CONST. amend. V. See generally Tushnet, The Newer Property: A Suggestion for the Revival
of Substantive Due Process, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 261; Comment, Testing the Constitutional
Validity of Land Use Regulations: Substantive Due Process as a Superior Alternative to Takings Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 715 (1982) (authored by Ross A. Macfarlane).
22. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (interpreting the "public
use" provision in the just compensation clause as the equivalent of the due process clause
requirement that governmental action must be justified by a legitimate governmental
objective).
23. Whether the absence of a public purpose alone constitutes a "taking" for purposes of
the just compensation clause has not been definitively determined. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. The Court did not have to address that issue in Keystone because it found
that the Subsidence Act was justified by several public purposes. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
24. 1921 Pa. Laws 1198.
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which prohibited coal mining under residences, advanced only the
private interests of the homeowners. In Keystone, on the other hand,
the Court held that the Subsidence Act, 2 *5which similarly prohibited
coal mining under residences, advanced the public interest in conservation of surface land areas, protected the public safety from the
harmful effects of subsidence, enhanced the value of surface lands
for taxation, aided in the preservation of surface water drainage and
public water supplies, and generally improved the use and enjoyment
of surface lands.2
The difference in outcomes between the Pennsylvania Coal and
Keystone decisions might be explained in any of several ways, none
of which proves entirely satisfactory. First, perhaps the Pennsylvania
legislature had done a better job of explicitly setting out the "publicness" of its purposes in the Subsidence Act than it had in the Kohler
Act.27 Yet it would seem odd if the way in which a legislature articulates its purposes is dispositive of what those purposes are insofar as
a reviewing court is concerned. 28 If legislative enactments that affect
only private economic interests are presumed valid-and, at least until Nollan was decided, that is what courts generally presumedthen any reasonably articulable legitimate governmental objective
will suffice, even if the legislature had not expressly or clearly set it
out in the legislation.29
Second, perhaps the Court in Keystone was simply more receptive to the Pennsylvania state counsel's arguments about the publicness of the Subsidence Act's purposes than it had been with respect
to similar arguments about the Kohler Act. Yet, again, it would
seem odd (although not unknown to happen), if the Court varied its
holdings depending on how forcefully counsel make arguments. This
presumes, of course, that the Court is reasonably made aware of
those arguments. Yet the Court in Pennsylvania Coal had been
made aware of several public purposes which the Kohler Act was
enacted to achieve, including prevention of loss of human life and
damage to streets, public and private buildings and public utility
25. The Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
52, § 1406.1-1406.21 (Purdon 1987).
26. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1243.
27. The extent to which the Court defers to legislative identification of public purposes is
discussed below with respect to the Nollan decision. See infra notes 60-95 and accompanying
text.
28. The manner in which legislators articulate their purposes is an important guide to
understanding what they voted on, but it is certainly not dispositive.
29. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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connections."0
Finally, perhaps the social mileau with respect to the need for
regulation of coal mining activities had changed between 1922 and
1987 to the point that the Justices were more willing to defer to
legislative identification of the Subsidence Act's public purposes.
This is evidenced by the Court's telling statement in Keystone that,

"[tihe Subsidence Act is a prime example that 'circumstances may
so change in time. . . as to clothe with such a [public] interest what
at other times . . . would be a matter of purely private concern.' "31
Keystone represents the traditional deference to legislative purposes that has characterized the Court's approach to governmental
conduct affecting property. Thus, this feature of the case makes no
new law, but instead represents a correction of the departure in
Pennsylvania Coal from the traditional deferential approach. The
troublesome aspect about this distinction between Keystone and
Pennsylvania Coal is that we are given no indication of what factors
other than the passage of time made the Court more receptive to the
publicness of the Subsidence Act than it had been to the Kohler Act.
B. DistinguishingPennsylvania Coal on the Ground of the
Relevant Property
After determining that the public purpose requirement had been

met, the Court went on to consider whether a "taking" of "property"
had occurred. Since the coal companies had made a facial attack on
Pennsylvania's Subsidence Act, the appropriate standard for determining whether a "taking" had occurred, the Court held, was
whether "economically viable use" of property had been denied.3 "
30. See Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1255 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); See also Rose,
Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561
(1984) (discussing the details of the litigation).
31. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1243 (quoting Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921).
32. See infra notes 72-84, 94-95 (discussing judicial deference to legislative
determinations).
33. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1247 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
In contrast, in attacks on legislation as applied to specific property, the challenger must show
that in consideration of several factors-including "the economic impact of the regulation, its
interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the government action"-justice and fairness require that the economic injuries caused by the legislation
should be borne by the government, rather than by the property owner. Id. (quoting Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)).
The demarcation between facial attacks and attacks on legislation as applied may not be
quite as definite as Keystone suggests. In Nollan, where legislation was attacked as applied to
a particular parcel, the Court said the applicable standard was whether the Nollans had been
denied the "economically viable use" of their land. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
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This, in turn, required the Court to define the relevant property.
The Court's perception of the relevant property is the second
distinction between Pennsylvania Coal and Keystone. In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court defined the relevant property narrowly, as consisting of the pillars of coal that would have to be left to prevent
subsidence of the overlying structures. In Keystone, the Court defined the relevant property broadly, as consisting of the entire coal
mine holdings of the companies involved. The scope of the relevant
property becomes critical to determining whether there has been a
"taking": if the relevant property is narrowly defined, considerably

less intrusive governmental action will constitute a taking, both for
purposes of a facial attack on legislation, as was involved in Keystone, and for purposes of an attack on legislation as applied, as in
Pennsylvania Coal. Moreover, and perhaps of greatest significance,
the analytical task of defining the relevant property appears to be the

same for both purposes.3
1. Pennsylvania Coal's Narrow Focus on the Relevant
Property

Pennsylvania law recognizes three distinct property interests in
coal lands: the right to use the surface of the land, the right to support of the surface and the right to mine coal under the surface. The
right to use the surface can be alienated-disembodied, as it
were-independently of the right to support of the surface.3 5 In
This is the standard which the Court in Keystone says applies only to facial attacks. Moreover,
the "as applied" standard itself is not as monolithic as the Keystone Court describes. See infra
note 49 and accompanying text (describing the two variations of that standard, the per se rule
and the multi-factor analysis).
34. Perhaps because it was aware of the difficulty of reconciling its decision with Pennsylvania Coal, the Court in Keystone first suggested that Pennsylvania Coal was inapplicable
because that case involved an attack on the Kohler Act as applied, whereas Keystone involved
a facial attack on the Subsidence Act. See Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1241 ("[Uincharacteristically-Justice Homes provided the parties with an advisory opinion discussing 'the
general validity of the Act.' "). The Court in Keystone emphasized that the "takings" standard
for facial attacks differs from that for "as applied" attacks. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. In its discussion of the relevant property, however, the Keystone Court treated both
Justice Holmes' discussion regarding the validity of the Kohler Act as applied, as well as his
discussion about its facial validity, as controlling precedent. See Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 124851. We may infer, therefore, that identifying the relevant property for purposes of determining
whether there is a "taking" under a facial attack does not differ from identifying the relevant
property for purposes of determining whether there is a "taking" under an attack on legislation "as applied."
35. Penman v. Jones, 256 Pa. 416, 100 A. 1043 (1917). See also Captline v. County of
Allegheny, 74 Pa. Super. 85, 459 A.2d 1298 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984) (this
separation of property interests is still a part of Pennsylvania Property Law).
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Pennsylvania Coal, that is what happened to the land upon which
the Mahons built their house. In 1878, the Pennsylvania Coal Company had sold the surface use rights to the land to Mrs. Mahon's
father. In the deed, the company had retained the right to the coal
under the land, as well as the right to support of the surface. Moreover, Mrs. Mahon's father had also contractually waived all claims
against the company for harm caused by subsidence resulting from
mining operations.- 6 The company therefore claimed both property
and contractual sources for the right to mine under the Mahons'
house without liability for subsidence resulting from mining
operations.
If it was established that the company did not have the right to
mine without providing for surface support or, conversely, that it
would have been liable for subsidence resulting from mining operations, then it would have had to either leave pillars of coal to support
the surface or install wooden timbers to achieve the same result. The
company argued that leaving wooden timbers was out of the question
because their cost would have far exceeded the value of the coal in
the pillars.3 7 The issue thus narrowed to whether the company had to
leave pillars of coal or not. So interpreted, therefore, Pennsylvania
Coal concerned the coal in the pillars as the relevant property.
The early part of Justice Holmes' opinion seemed to adopt this
perspective of the relevant property: "[T]he extent of the taking is
great. [The Kohler Act] purports to abolish what is recognized in
Pennsylvania as an estate in land-a very valuable estate-and what
is declared by the Court below to be a contract hitherto binding the
plaintiffs." 3 8 Whether conceived as deriving from property or contract, the nature of the right was the same-the right to mine irrespective of surface subsidence-evidenced by the pillars of coal.
Later in the opinion, however, Justice Holmes made an ambiguous reference to the relevant property: "What makes the right to
mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with profit. To make it
commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying
39
it."
36. Under Pennsylvania common law, such covenants run with the land. See Keystone,
107 U.S. at 1252 n.32 (1987).
37. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Petitioners' Brief in Error, O.T. 1922, No.
549, pp. 7-9.
38. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
39. Id. (emphasis added).
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One interpretation of this language which is perfectly consistent
with the Court's narrow definition of the relevant property is that the
words "certain coal" and "with profit" refer to mining the coal in
the pillars. The company had argued that the value of the coal in the
pillars was exceeded by the cost of installing timber supports and
that therefore there would be no profit from mining that coal. Accordingly, Justice Holmes' reference to the state's preventing the
coal company from mining with profit refers narrowly to mining the
coal in the pillars.
2.

Keystone's "Profit" Test

In Keystone, the Court interpreted Pennsylvania Coal quite differently, however. The Court considered the coal companies' rights
under three categories: the deed-retained right to mine coal, the
deed-retained right to the support estate and the contractually-acquired right to mine coal without liability for damages from resulting subsidence. With respect to the right to mine coal, the Court
focused on Justice Holmes' reference to "profit" as the operative
term. It said:
The 27 million tons of coal do not constitute a separate segment of
property for takings law purposes.
We do not consider Justice Holmes' statement that the Kohler
Act made mining of "certain coal" commercially impracticable as
requiring us to focus on the individual pillars of coal that must be
left in place. That statement is best understood as referring to the
Pennsylvania Coal Company's assertion that it could not undertake
profitable anthracite coal mining in light of the Kohler Act.4
The Keystone court thus purported to introduce a "profit" test
for determining takings: If profit-making operations are precluded,
whether narrowly focused on mining the coal in the pillars or on the
entire operations of the individual coal company, a taking occurs.
Thus, mining the coal in the pillars was supposedly held unprofitable
in Pennsylvania Coal because the cost of wooden timbers exceeded
the value of the coal in the pillars.4 1 Similarly, mining coal in gen40. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1249.
41. Of course, the company also argued that the Subsidence Act made it commercially impracticable to mine the very coal that had to be left in place. Although they
could have constructed pillars for support in place of the coal, the cost of the artificial pillars would have far exceeded the value of the coal. See Pennsylvania Coal
[Co.] v. Mahon, Petitioners' Brief in Error, O.T. 1922, No. 549, pp. 7-9.

HOFSTRA PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:39

eral was supposedly unprofitable for the Pennsylvania Coal Company, since six coal mines were unable to operate. 2
Applying the test to the facts in Keystone, the Court held:
When the coal that must remain beneath the ground is viewed in
the context of any reasonable unit of petitioners' coal mining operations and financial-backed expectations, it is plain that the petitioners have not come close to satisfying their burden of proving
that they have been denied economically viable use of that property. The record indicates that only about 75% of petitioners' underground coal can be profitably mined in any event, and there is
no showing that petitioners' reasonable "investment-backed expectations" have been materially affected by the additional duty to
retain the small percentage that must be used to support the structures protected by [the Subsidence Act] ."
A "profit" test is a treacherous foundation for takings doctrine.
Under such a test, whether a taking occurs depends on whether governmental regulation prevents the profitable operation of the industries being regulated. That would depend, in turn, on whether the
cost of avoiding the detrimental effects of industrial operations-surface subsidence, toxic wastes or any other negative externality-can be passed on to consumers. Thus, the ultimate upshot of
the Keystone court's conclusion, explained under a "profit" test,
would be that in 1922 the price of coal could not be raised to account for the costs of compliance with the Kohler Act, whereas in
1987 the price of coal can be adjusted to account for the costs of
compliance with the Subsidence Act.""
However, there was no discussion of the relative ability of the
Keystone, 107 S.Ct. at 1249 n.26. (This footnote from Keystone is ambiguous. It seems to
refer to the Petitioners argument in the Pennsylvania Coal case, yet refers to the Subsidence
Act, involved in the Keystone case).
42. For example, the coal company claimed that one company was "unable to operate
six large [coal mines] in the city of Scranton." Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1249 (quoting Motion
to Advance for Argument in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, O.T. 1922, No. 549, p. 2.)
43. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1249.
44. Admittedly, the Court in Keystone held only that the companies had failed to show
that they could not operate profitably. Id. at 1249. However, the Court seemed to conclude
that no such showing would have been possible:
When the coal that must remain beneath the ground is viewed in the context of any
reasonable unit of petitioners' coal mining operations and financial-backed expectations, it is plain that the petitioners have not come close to satisfying their burden of
proving that they have been denied the economically viable use of that property.
Id. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of "economically
viable use.").
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coal companies to pass on the costs of compliance in either Pennsylvania Coal or Keystone. More fundamentally, a "profit" test would
mean that if such costs could not be passed on, takings would result.
The relative efficiency of the regulated industries in passing on costs
would therefore determine whether takings had occurred. The most
inefficient industries could not be regulated-at least not without
payment of just compensation-because of their inefficiency. 5
Surely both economists and lawyers would agree that this is not a
sound approach.
3. Keystone's Approach Construed as a Broad Focus on the
Relevant Property
A frank acknowledgement by the Court in Keystone that it was
taking a broader focus of the relevant property, on the other hand,
would have been justifiable on a principled basis and also consistent
with the rest of the Court's opinion. Perhaps the considerations
which justify a broader or narrower focus of the relevant property
are historically contingent. Thus, the Court's approach in Keystone
may reflect the development of a social consensus between 1922 and
1987 regarding the need for governmental regulation to avoid the
profound, long-term threats to public health and safety, such as subsidence, that coal mining represents. Accordingly, a broader focus
and, consequently, greater leeway for governmental regulation, was
proper. Since the extent of the threat posed by the use of property is
significantly related to, if not necessarily directly correlated with, the
property under the control of the owner, narrowing or broadening
the scope of the relevant property in accordance with evolving social
consensus seems a sensible approach.
Judicial declaration that a general social consensus has developed with respect to an issue of public concern is not without its
shortcomings. Courts could understandably be challenged on
whether they should be engaged in "taking the public pulse" as well
as on the inexactness of that undertaking. In Keystone, however, the
broadening of the scope of the relevant property was determined by
the legislature, not by the Court. This was most evident in the
Court's discussion of the companies' contract right to be free from
liability caused by mining subsidence. Though conceding that the
45. The just compensation clause does not prohibit takings; only uncompensated ones.
See First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2385-86 ("[The just compensation clause] does not prohibit
the taking of private property, but instead . . . secure[s] compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.").
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Subsidence Act "substantially impaired" the companies' contract
rights, the Court held that such impairment was justified in light of
the public interest in preventing mining operations from making a
"shambles of . . .buildings and cemeteries.""'
The emphasis on the broader focus of the relevant property concerning the right to mine coal is also consistent with the Keystone
court's discussion of the effect of the Subsidence Act on the coal
companies' support estate interest. Contrary to the distinct character
of that interest under Pennsylvania law, the Court held that the support estate was not "property" for federal constitutional purposes:
[I]n practical terms, the support estate has value only insofar as it
protects or enhances the value of the estate with which it is associated. Its value is merely a part of the entire bundle of rights possessed by the owner of either the coal or the surface. Because petitioners retain the right to mine virtually all of the coal in their
mineral estates, the burden the Act places on the support estate
does not constitute a taking.4
Thus, the Court essentially refused to take a narrow focus of the
support estate in isolation from the right to mine the coal or the
right to use the surface.
4. Keystone Summary
The Court's decision in Keystone can best be explained as involving a broader focus of the relevant property than Justice Holmes
undertook in Pennsylvania Coal. The difference in focus is historically contingent, based on a legislatively determined increased societal need for regulation of coal mining. Instead of forthrightly acknowledging this difference, the Court in Keystone introduced a
"profit" test that is analytically suspect.
The difference in the focus of the relevant property in each case
had a dramatic impact on the subsequent question whether a taking
had occurred. Thus, in Pennsylvania Coal, the coal owner was
deemed to have been deprived of all of the relevant property, leading
to the conclusion that a taking had occurred, whereas in Keystone,
although the coal owner was deemed deprived of some of the relevant property (the coal in the pillars, the support estate and the contract rights involved), a complete deprivation was not involved, so no
taking was found. Under the Keystone court's "profit" test, one
46.
47.

Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1252.
Id. at 1250.
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would have to conclude that the coal company in Pennsylvania Coal
could not profitably carry on its operations whereas in Keystone the
coal companies had not shown they could not do so. This distinction,
as pointed out above, is more than problematic; it is analytically
unsound.
Since the scope of the relevant property thus dramatically affects the outcome in a takings case, it is critical that the controlling
factors should be identified with precision. Unfortunately, the Court
did not do so in Keystone. We are thus left with a powerful difference in the scope of the relevant property without clear guidance
about the factors that motivated the change. That omission will inevitably lead to greater uncertainty in the field, with property advocates predictably asserting that the relevant property in their circumstances is very narrow in scope and governmental advocates
asserting with equal conviction that the relevant property is very
broad.
II.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A "TAKING"?-THE

COURT FORMULATES

A JUSTIFICATION RULE FOR PER SE TAKINGS IN

Nollan

The Nollan decision establishes two fundamental propositions.
One favors governmental entities, the other favors property owners.
Favoring governmental entities, the Court held that even if governmental conduct is held to be a per se taking, it will not necessarily
run afoul of the just compensation clause. Favoring property owners,
the Court held that per se takings will trigger a close level of judicial
scrutiny that has not been generally available for protection of property interests since the early part of this century.
A.

Not All Per Se Takings Require Compensation

The Court has developed two major standards for determining
whether the application "s of a governmental regulation to specific
property effects a "taking": a multi-factor analysis and a per se
rule."9 Under the multi-factor analysis the Court has said that three
factors have particular significance: the economic impact of the reg48. In Keystone, the Court emphasized that in facial attacks on legislation affecting
property, the challenger must show that he or she has been deprived of "economically viable
use" of the property. In contrast, in challenges to legislation as applied, the multi-factor analysis and the per se rule control. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
49. For a recent discussion of the two approaches, see Ragsdale, A Synthesis and Integration of Supreme Court Precedent Regarding the Regulatory Taking of Land, 55 UMKC
L. REV. 213, 222-23 (1987).
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ulation on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation interferes
with identifiable investment-backed expectations and the character
of the governmental action." However, the Court has not particularly defined those factors nor explained their relationship to each
other, and candidly admits that it engages in essentially ad hoc
inquiries. 5 1
The per se rule, on the other hand, provides that a permanent
physical occupation undertaken directly by government or by private
parties authorized by government is a taking. That rule was first announced in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,5 2 in
which the Court held that New York could not authorize a private
television cable company to install cables and relay boxes on privately owned apartment buildings to provide cable television services
to the tenants because such cables and relay boxes were "permanent
physical occupations" of private property which constituted "takings" per se.
In Nollan, the Court began by applying the per se rule. It held
that requiring a private property owner to give the public "a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property [would] continuously be traversed, even though no particular
individual [was] permitted to station himself permanently upon the
premises," amounted to a permanent physical occupation that constituted a per se taking."
In First English, decided just prior to Nollan, the Court held
that if a taking is found, compensation is constitutionally required
under the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment." It
therefore would have been natural to expect the Court in Nollan to
have held without further analysis that the Commission was required
to pay the Nollans just compensation." Instead, the Court considered whether the lateral access condition imposed on the Nollans
"substantially advanced a legitimate state interest" or denied them
50. See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 21, 212 (1986).
51. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) ("essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries").
52. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
53. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145 (1987).
54. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct.
2378 (1987) is discussed below. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
55. Although First English did not involve a per se taking, as did Nollan, the Court in
First English did not differentiate between per se takings and takings ascertained using the
multi-factor analysis.
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"economically viable use" of their land.56 Since the Court found that
the access condition did not substantially advance a legitimate state
interest, it did not consider whether the Nollans were nevertheless
denied economically viable use of their land. The Court's consideration of whether the access condition substantially advanced a legitimate state interest is potentially so significant, however, that we may
refer to it as the "per se taking justification rule" for purposes of
further analysis.
It is helpful to situate the per se taking justification rule in the
context of the larger "property-taking-remedy" framework for analysis. The rule is an intermediate construct between the determination that a taking has occurred and the remedial question, with implications for both. It does not directly concern whether a taking has
occurred because the Court did not articulate and apply the per se
taking justification rule until after it had found a taking under the
per se rule.57 On the other hand, if governmental action is justified
under the rule, and government is thereby exonerated of responsibility, then the result is the same as if no "taking" had been found in
the first place. Similarly, the per se taking justification rule is not
directly concerned with the remedy that should be provided for takings because under First English, it seems clear that compensation is
56. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146.
57. There is some authority which suggests that there is a third takings test for challenging legislation "as applied," in addition to the per se rule and the multi-factor analysis discussed above. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. The Court has said that if governmental action does not substantially advance a legitimate governmental objective, a
"taking" occurs. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455, 459 (1985)
(quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)); see Laitos and Westfall, Government
Interference With Private Interests in Public Resources, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 66
(1987) (referring to this as a "third" takings test).
Treating all circumstances in which governmental action merely "reasonably" rather than
"substantially" advances legitimate governmental objectives would come dangerously close to
making it a tort for government to govern. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57 (1952)
(Jackson, J., dissenting). Recognizing this, perhaps, the Court recently held that deliberate,
rather than merely negligent, governmental conduct must be shown in order to establish a due
process deprivation. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), overruling Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527 (1981). If the Court will not impose governmental liability for negligent governmental conduct, a fortiori, it should also be unwilling to impose it for reasonable conduct.
The per se taking justification rule adopted by the Court in Nollan looks suspiciously like
the questionable "third" takings test for determining whether a taking has occurred. And one
could argue that if governmental action is justified under the per se taking justification rule,
and therefore government is exonerated of responsibility, then the result is the same as if no
"taking" had been found. However, that overlooks the critical fact that the Court in Nollan
had found a taking before it embarked on the elaboration of the per se taking justification rule.
Accordingly, the "third" takings test notwithstanding, it is fairly clear that the per se taking
justification rule is not for the purpose of determining whether or not there has been a taking.
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constitutionally compelled." On the other hand, the remedial impact

of the rule is unquestionable: if governmental action is justified
under the rule, even though a per se taking has been established, no

remedy is forthcoming.
Regardless of whether the per se taking justification rule is
characterized as part of the takings determination, as part of the
remedial determination, as part of both, or as a completely different
construct, it should partially relieve governmental agencies' fears
about the potential for extensive, unpredictable and recurrent governmental liability generated by the Court's decision in First En-

glish." On the other hand, there is continuing reason for such fears
given the manner in which the Court indicated it will apply the per
se taking justification rule.
B.

Analysis of the Per Se Takings JustificationRule

The per se taking justification rule is a standard for judicial re-

view of governmental action.60 Standards of judicial review may be
analyzed in terms of four factors: First, what kind of private interest

is affected? Second, how important must the justificatory governmental objective be? Third, how tight must the "fit" between the
means used in the circumstances and the governmental objective be?
Fourth, to what extent will a court require that the means used in
58. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
59. However, since the case involved a per se taking, it is not necessarily relevant where
a taking is ascertained using the broader, multi-factor alternative to the per se rule. See supra
notes 48-51 and accompanying text. Such circumstances might arise where governmental actions are not clearly physical invasions. In those settings, perhaps, governmental agencies may
nevertheless be subject to the almost automatic determination that compensation must be provided, apparently dictated by First English.
In a sense, such a result might be appropriate. The primary criticism of the per se rule
has been that it does not allow for consideration of the countervailing public interest factors in
any given situation. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 442
(1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional
Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1983). Accordingly, it makes sense for
the Court to have formulated the per se taking justification rule to ameliorate that problem. As
discussed below in the text, the per se taking justification rule allows for weighing of the public
and private interests involved even though a per se taking has been found. See infra notes 6192 and accompanying text. That balance favors the private interests affected, so the per se
situation as a whole is still less favorable to governments than the multi-factor approach.
In contrast, the multi-factor approach takes public interests into account as part and parcel of the takings determination. Accordingly, it may make no sense to apply the per se taking
justification rule outside of the per se context because to do so would give the government two
chances to argue the public interests involved instead of one.
60. Justice Brennan's dissent in Nollan discusses this issue. See Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at
3151-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the circumstances be the least restrictive of the private interest affected? In terms of these four factors, the per se taking justification
rule represents at least a potential source of greater protection for
property interests. Governmental objectives need only be "legitimate" rather than "substantial" or "compelling," but the means
used must "substantially advance" them. Finally, it is unclear
whether the "least restrictive means" must be used.
1. Property Rights Protection Versus "FundamentalRights"
and "Suspect Trait" Protection
When only property rights are affected, the Court has traditionally deferred to governmental agency identification of legitimate governmental objectives and selection of the means through which such
objectives should be achieved.61 Such governmental determinations
are presumed valid, meaning that the government need only make a
minimal showing that there is a rational relationship between the
means used and a legitimate governmental objective, whereupon the
challenger must overcome the resulting presumption that the governmental objective is legitimate and that the relationship to the means
is reasonable.62 In contrast, such deference is not forthcoming when
fundamental rights such as speech or privacy,6 3 or suspect trait classifications such as race," are involved. In such "close scrutiny"
cases, after the challenger has made out a prima facie case that a
fundamental right has been affected or that a suspect trait classification is involved, the government has a heavy burden of showing that
the means used are essential or necessary for achieving a substantially important or compelling governmental objective.
The rights involved in Nollan were clearly property rights. The
61. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-2 to 16-5 (1978)
(discussing minimum rationality review under the equal protection clause).
But see R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985) (arguing that close scrutiny is required when property is affected by governmental
action).
62. The classic case for minimum rationality review, in which the Court itself articulated the possible justificatory legitimate governmental objectives that would sustain a statute,
is Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
63. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) (freedom of association). For a recent discussion of fundamental interests generally, see
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
But see Baker, Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U.
PA. L. REV. 741 (1986) (criticizing the dichotomy between liberty and property interests and
suggesting that we need to refine our understanding of both).
64. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 16-14 (1978).
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Nollans were being affected in their ability to exclude others from
their land, particularly from the portion of their land that would
have been subject to the public access easement. 65 Ordinarily, this
would call for relatively minimal judicial scrutiny. Yet the Court's
application of the per se taking justification rule indicates that it is a
more searching inquiry. 66 We may explore the dimensions of the rule
in terms of the other factors for analyzing standards of judicial
7
review.

6

2.

"Important" Versus Merely "Legitimate" Governmental
Objectives

Under minimal scrutiny judicial review courts ask whether
there is any conceivable "legitimate" governmental objective involved. 68 Since governmental authority generally includes the power
to regulate for the general health, safety, welfare and morals,6 9 traditionally collectively referred to as the police power, at least one of

these will usually be available to justify governmental action.
In contrast, close scrutiny judicial review requires a significantly
important justificatory governmental objective. How a "legitimate"
governmental objective is to be distinguished from a more significantly important governmental objective has been the subject of
much debate, but little consensus. 0 In Nollan, however, the Court
held that preservation of the public's view of the beach and even
65. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145.
66. Conventional standards of judicial review apply to a court's examination of the
whole case. In contrast, the per se taking justification rule is a special form of judicial review,
triggered only after a per se taking has been found. Thus, Nollan should not be read as the
adoption of "whole-case" close scrutiny judicial review, either with respect to cases involving
governmental action affecting property in general, or with respect to takings cases in particular. See also supra note 59 (discussing the related point that the per se taking justification rule
is not an alternative "takings" test to the per se rule and the multi-factor analysis approach).
67. See supra note 60 at 3151-54 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. Thus, only when improper governmental objectives are involved will governmental action fail this aspect of judicial review. See
e.g., City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539
(1980) (Even aside from its effects on fundamental concerns such as privacy, preventing
groups of unrelated persons from living together in a single family residence zone on the
ground that they would create an immoral environment for families with children would not
pass minimal scrutiny as a legitimate objective of a city ordinance restricting a "single family
residence" zone).
69. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
70. See generally Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestionfor the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 SuP. CT. REV. 261; Comment, Testing the Constitutional Validity of
Land Use Regulations: Substantive Due Process as a Superior Alternative to Takings Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 715 (1982) (authored by Ross A. Macfarlane).
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acquisition of public access along the beach were "legitimate" governmental interests. 1
3.

"'Tight" Versus "Loose" Fits Between Means and Ends

In minimal scrutiny settings, governmental action is typically
sustained if the means used to achieve the relevant governmental objective are reasonably likely to lead to its achievement. This is commonly referred to as the "rational relationship" standard.7 In contrast, in close scrutiny situations, the means used must be
"necessary" to the achievement of the governmental objective.
Under that criterion, the government must show that .there is no
other feasible way in which the objective can be achieved other than
through the means selected.
In Nollan, the Court set out a standard that requires more than
a rational relationship between means and ends, but less than a necessary connection. The means used must "substantially advance" the
governmental ends sought to be achieved."'
The Commission contended that the Nollans' proposed threebedroom house would obstruct public view of the beach and that this
would in turn deter the public from using the admittedly public portions of the beach lying immediately adjacent to the Nollans' property.74 The Commission thus argued that the primary objective it
sought to achieve through the access condition was the preservation
of public views and that protecting public access was merely a sec75
ondary, related objective.
The Court assumed without deciding that the Nollans' house
would obstruct public views.7 ' It agreed with the Commission that
protecting the public's view of the beach, considered independently,
was a legitimate state interest that could be protected through the
Commission's power to limit or deny the Nollans' coastal development permit. It also agreed that public views might have been protected through conditions on permits such as height and width limi71. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3147-48.
72. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 61, §§ 16-2 to 16-5 (1978).
73. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146.
74. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3143-44. The Court noted:
[a] quarter-mile north of [the Nollans] property is Faria County Park, an oceanside
public park with a public beach and recreation area. Another public beach area,
known locally as "the Cove," lies 1,800 feet south of their lot.
Id. at 3143.
75. Id. at 3148-49.
76. Id. at 3147.
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tations and bans on fences. Moreover, it also expressly approved a
condition requiring the Nollans to provide a viewing spot on their
property for the public to use." Thus, the Court did not object to a
public access condition as long as it was imposed as a measure to
mitigate obstruction of public views resulting from the nature or
manner of construction of the proposed development.
The Court concluded, however, that the access condition "ut-

terly failed" to advance the objective of protecting public views. 8
Further, it disagreed with the Commission that blocking of public
views would in turn obstruct public access. 79 Thus, the Court held
that the access condition was not justified either to protect public
views or to preserve public access detrimentally affected through the
77. The Court said:
The Commission argues that a permit condition that serves the same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should not be found to be a
taking if the refusal to issue the permit would not constitute a taking. We agree.
Thus, if the Commission attached to the permit some condition that would have
protected the public's ability to see the beach notwithstanding construction of the
new house-for example, a height limitation, a width restriction, or a ban on
fences--so long as the Commission could have exercised its police power (as we
have assumed it could) to forbid construction of the house altogether, imposition of
the condition would also be constitutional. Moreover (and here we come closer to
the facts of the present case), the condition would be constitutional even if it consisted of the requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property
for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere.
Although such a requirement, constituting a permanent grant of continuous access
to the property, would have to be considered a taking if it were not attached to a
development permit, the Commission's assumed power to forbid construction of the
house in order to protect the public's view of the beach must surely include the
power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner, even a concession of property rights, that serves the same end. If a prohibition designed to accomplish that purpose would be a legitimate exercise of the police power rather than a
taking, it would be strange to conclude that providing the owner an alternative to
that prohibition which accomplishes the same purpose is not.
Id. at 3147-48.
78. "[Tihe condition ... utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition." Id. at 3148.
79. The Court said:
Rewriting the argument to eliminate the play on words makes clear that there is
nothing to it. It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property
reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house. It is also
impossible to understand how it lowers any "psychological barrier" to using
the public beaches, or how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on
them caused by construction of the Nollans' new house. We therefore find that
the Commission's imposition of the permit condition cannot be treated as an
exercise of its land use power for any of these purposes.
Id. at 3149 (footnote omitted).
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assumed negative impact on public views.
Since the Court held there was no connection between the regulatory objectives involved and the access condition, the circumstances
would not have passed muster under the rational relationship standard either. This may cast doubt on the Court's statements that the
means must "substantially advance" the ends sought to be achieved,
since that part of the opinion was not integral to the outcome and
thus not part of the holding. Still, the Court specifically rejected the
idea that rational relationship will be the standard. 0 Thus, even if
the enhanced "substantial advancement" standard is not essential to
the outcome in Nollan, it is certainly instructive dictum.
Without the connection to the preservation of public views, the
Court pointed out, the access condition was, by default, simply a
means for advancing the entirely different state interest in acquiring
public access across the Nollans' private property.8 1 Although that
objective was also a legitimate one, achieving it through the regulatory route of imposing an access condition on the Nollans' development permit under the circumstances was improper. The only proper
means for achieving that objective in the circumstances, the Court
concluded, was through the direct condemnation of an easement and
the payment of just compensation for it.82
The Coastal Commission has several options after the Supreme
Court's decision in Nollan. There was a question in the case whether
the public already had rights in the land over which the easement
80. "We have required that the regulation 'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state
interest' sought to be achieved, not that 'the State "could rationally have decided" the measure
adopted might achieve the State's objective.' " Id. at 3147 n.3 (citations omitted).
81. "[T]he lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the building
restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose,
but without payment of compensation." Id. at 3148.
82. Id. The Court thus appeared to conceive of the Commission's action as a destabilizing measure aimed at forcing a public benefit in the form of public access from the Nollans,
whereas the Commission had contended that its action was a stabilizing measure aimed at
preventing the Nollans' proposed construction from causing public harm through reduction of
public access.
So viewed, the Court's analysis bears some resemblance to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's discussion in Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). In that
case the court drew a distinction between governmental action securing a public benefit-which might amount to a taking for which compensation would be required-and governmental action preventing property owners from using their property to cause a public
harm-which might justifiably be characterized as regulatory action for which compensation
was not required. Id. at 16, 201 N.W.2d at 767-68. For a discussion of the Just case, see
Large, This Land is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Property, 1973 Wis. L.
REV. 1039 (1973).
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condition was sought to be imposed. 85 Thus, the Commission may
subsequently establish that the public had rights over the property in
spite of the decision in Nollan.
If the Commission fails to establish pre-existing public rights
over the property and it nevertheless wishes to acquire the public
access easement, it can condemn such an easement and pay the Nollans its fair market value. Alternatively, the Commission may simply
abandon the attempt to acquire such an easement and lift the condition. If the Commission chooses to condemn an easement or if it
abandons the attempt altogether, as discussed below with respect to
First English, the Commission will have to pay the Nollans interim
damages for the time when the condition was improperly applied to
the property."
4.

Consideration of Alternative Means

In some close scrutiny settings, even if governmental action is
supported by a sufficiently important governmental objective and the
connection between the objective and the means used is relatively
close-though short of being necessary-challengers may show that
there are other, less onerous means which would also lead to the
achievement of the governmental objective.8 5 In those settings, the
governmental entity may be required to utilize one of those other
"less restrictive alternatives" instead of the means it has selected.8 6
The Court in Nollan did not discuss whether the least restrictive
83. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3161 n.I I (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text. Presumably, if the public had rights
over the property all along, the Commission might not be required to pay interim damages.
Even if the public did not have pre-existing rights over the property, the Nollans might
still not recover. First, they may be unable to show they have suffered any interim damages,
since they went ahead and built their three-bedroom house in disregard of the Commission's
condition. Second, even if they did suffer damages, the Commission may argue that they are
estopped from recovering them because of that conduct.
85. If the connection between the means used and the objective sought to be achieved
must be a "necessary" one, then the question of less restrictive means may drop out, since the
government will have to show there are no other ways in which the objective might be achieved
other than through the means it selected. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
The least restrictive means notion may nevertheless come into play as a way in which the
challenger can dispute the government's showing of the necessity of the means selected
through demonstrating that there are other ways in which the objective could be achieved that
would be less restrictive of the rights involved. (This is discussed in the text accompanying this
footnote.).
86. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-30 (1978) (discussing the concept of less restrictive alternatives in the context of first amendment protections
from laws that are overbroad or vague).
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means would be required, but in Keystone, the Court seems to have
rejected that notion. 87 Moreover, in Nollan, the Court said that the
access condition would be allowed only if it "substantially advanced"
a legitimate governmental objective and did not deny the Nollans
"economically viable use" of their land. 8 We may infer that if the
access condition had substantially advanced a legitimate governmental objective, such as preventing the Nollans from obstructing public
access, for instance, then the condition would have been unobjectionable unless it had also deprived them of "economically viable use" of
their land. Whether that phrase is somehow a proxy for the least
restrictive means requirement, however, is problematic.
"Economically viable use" of land might mean complete, unhampered use. Thus, any restriction would be invalid. This interpretation is highly unlikely, because the Court expressly approved the
requirement of a "viewing spot" if proposed construction obstructed
public views of the beach. 89 Similarly, it would seem that if the Nollans had proposed constructing their house immediately inland of the
ocean boundary of their property and that if such construction unquestionably obstructed the passage of the public to admittedly public lands adjacent to their property, 90 then the Commission's imposition of the public access condition would have been upheld. 9' Since
87. The Court said there:
We do not suggest that courts have a "license to judge the effectiveness of legislation," ... or that courts are to undertake "least restrictive alternative" analysis in
deciding whether a state regulatory scheme is designed to remedy a public harm or
is instead intended to provide private benefits. That a land use regulation may be
somewhat overinclusive or underinclusive is, of course, no justification for rejecting
it. But, on the other hand, Pennsylvania Coal instructs courts to examine the operative provisions of a statute, not just its stated purpose, in assessing its true nature.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1243 n.16 (1987) (citation
omitted).
88. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3146 (1987) (quoting Agins
v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225, 260 (1980)).
89. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the public areas adjacent to
the Nollans' property).
91. It is unlikely that in those circumstances the Nollans could successfully argue, for
example, that instead of imposing a public access condition the Commission should require
them to elevate the first floor of the house along the seaward side, thereby allowing public
access.
On the other hand, in a future situation indistinguishable from Nollan, the Court will
disapprove of the Commission's simply writing its findings to conclude that the proposed construction will directly impair public access along the coast:
We do not share Justice BRENNAN's confidence that the Commission "should
have little difficulty in the future in utilizing its expertise to demonstrate a specific
connection between provisions for access and burdens on access," . . . that will
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the access condition in those circumstances would not prevent the
Nollans from building their house, certainly an "economically viable
use of their land," the access condition would probably withstand
judicial review.9 2
5.

Nollan Summary

Nollan sounds a retreat from an interpretation of First English
that would require compensation in all per se takings situations. Yet
the manner in which the Court applied the per se taking justification
rule leads one to believe that the Court will hold governments to a
rather high standard of conduct to avoid the requirement of compen-

sation. In a profoundly significant sense, the Court's determination
that the Commission really intended to acquire an easement rather
than to mitigate the potential adverse impact from the Nollans' proposed construction is inconsistent with recent decisions in which the
Court has held that governments are not liable for harm caused unintentionally or even negligently. 8 The Court's decision in Nollan,
coupled with its decision in First English, effectively holds the Coinavoid the effect of today's decision. We view the Fifth Amendment's property clause
to be more than a pleading requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an
exercise in cleverness and imagination.
Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3150.
92. This presupposes that the Court would treat the entire parcel as the relevant property. There are at least two alternative definitions of the relevant property, however.
If the relevant property were deemed to be the area along the seaward boundary of the
Nollans' lot which would have been subject to the access condition, then whether the Nollans
were deprived of the "economically viable use" of their property would focus more narrowly on
that part of the lot. Although the Court has said that mere diminution of property is insufficient to constitute a taking, it is not clear whether allowing the public to cross and recross this
smaller area would so affect its use by the Nollans that it would amount to deprivation of
"economically viable use." See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31
(1978) (diminution in the value of property alone does not constitute a taking).
As a third alternative, if the relevant property were deemed to be the Nollan's right to
exclude others-whether from the entire parcel or from the smaller area along the seaward
boundary of their property-then it is highly likely that the Nollans would prevail because
they would thereby have been deprived of all their "property." Cf. First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987) (deprivation of all use of
property assumed to be a taking).
All this, of course, demonstrates the importance of the threshold definition of the scope of
the relevant property. See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text (discussing the relative
uncertainty with respect to the factors that control the scope of the relevant property for takings purposes).
93. The Court had formerly held that negligent governmental conduct unduly affecting
private property would give rise to a claim for damages under the due process clause. Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). The Court recently overruled Parratt, holding instead that
deliberate governmental conduct has to be shown in order to establish a due process deprivation. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
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mission strictly liable.
In addition, the Court's second-guessing of the Commission regarding whether obstructing public views would in turn restrict public access may signal closer judicial scrutiny of governmental conduct found to be a per se taking. This may indicate the Court's
willingness to assume an activist posture with respect to protection of
property interests which has not been seen since the Lochner era at
the turn of the century. 9' If so, this may involve courts in general-and the Supreme Court in particular-in close supervision of
government demands that developers make concessions such as contributions for road construction, recreational facilities and low-income housing before land development permits will be granted. 95

III.

IF A TAKING HAS OCCURRED, COMPENSATION IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPELLED-FirstEnglish

The issue in First English originates with Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal. That case involves an appeal from a state
court injunction preventing a coal owner from mining under a private residence in such a manner as to cause the residence to subside.
Referring to the contract,' e due process' 7 and just compensation"8
clauses, the Supreme Court held the injunction improper and allowed the coal owner to proceed. Since the coal owner did not request it, the Court did not consider whether compensation was required for the time between the imposition of the injunction and the
lifting of it by the Court. As a result, the case gave rise to two contending theories.
The just compensation theory provided that the issue was to be
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON§§ 8-2-8-4 (1978).
The notion that Lochner was correctly decided, and that the Court should take an activist
posture with respect to takings, is a central tenet of Richard Epstein's recent book. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). That proposition, among others in the book, has suffered critical rejection. Compare Merrill, Rent
Seeking and the Compensation Principle,80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1561, 1561-63 (1986) (discussing
some of the criticisms of the book and referring to its underlying strengths); with Ross, Taking
Takings Seriously, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1591, 1592 (1986) (referring to the book, at least from
an academic perspective as "a patent and howling failure.").
95. See Powell's Resignation Wasn't the Only Bombshell, Nat'l L.J. July 20, 1987, at 5,
col. 1.
96. The contract clause prohibits a state from passing a "law impairing the obligation of
contracts". U. S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
97. See supra note 21 (quoting the text of the fourteenth amendment's process clause).
98. See supra note 1 (quoting the text of the fifth amendment's just compensation
clause).
94.
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resolved under the plain meaning of the just compensation clause: if
a taking occurred, compensation was required as a matter of course.
The due process theory, on the other hand, interpreted Justice
Holmes' reference to the just compensation clause metaphorically.
Under that theory a "taking" was a situation where government had
simply overstepped its bounds by improperly regulating private activity. In those circumstances, the theory provided, the due process
clause requires only that the offending regulation should be
invalidated.9 9
In First English, Los Angeles County had passed an interim
ordinance prohibiting the rebuilding of a summer camp called
Lutherglen after a storm had caused flooding which had damaged or
destroyed most of the camp. The Court adopted the just compensation theory by holding that if the property owner had indeed been
subjected to a taking by the county ordinance, (a question the Court
did not decide), then not only was the ordinance invalid, but the
county had to provide the property owner with damages for the period during which the property was so restricted.
The Court's adoption of the just compensation theory will have
at least two significant effects on takings litigation. First, since the
ultimate payoff for a successful challenge to a governmental restriction of property is money, such challenges are more likely to be
brought. Second, this in turn may lead governmental officials to act
with greater circumspection when takings might result, as proponents of the due process theory argued.10 0
The impact of First English may be overstated, however. Even
if the Court had adopted the due process theory, takings litigation
nevertheless would have been encouraged because it would still have
been possible to reverse governmental action through the remedy of
invalidation. Also, under a due process regime, governmental officials
might have been just as anxious to avoid the negative publicity and
expense of takings litigation. Finally, after Nollan, it seems that at
least with respect to per se takings, compensation will not be automatically available.
CONCLUSION

Justice Stevens said in his dissent in First English:
99. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172 (1985), in which the Court discussed the application of both the due process and just
compensation theories, but refused to select one or the other.
100. Id. (discussing the opposing scholarly commentary regarding the two theories).
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One thing is certain. The Court's decision today will generate a
0
great deal of litigation.0'

That also accurately summarizes the foreseeable effect of the 1987
trilogy of takings cases.

101. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct.
2378, 2389-90 (1987) (Stevens, J.,dissenting).

